A little background … the tripartite definition of knowledge (or classical account of knowledge) defines knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). Logically, it goes like this:
- “S knows that p iff
- p is true;
- S believes that p;
- S is justified in believing that p.” (1)
(S = subject | p = proposition | iff = if and only if)
Roughly translated, for every belief one holds, in order for it to be considered knowledge, it must also be sufficiently justified and true at the same time. For example, if one were to observe an atomic clock that read 8:01 UTC, they would be justified in the belief that the time is indeed 8:01 UTC. In order for that belief to be true, it must actually be 8:01 UTC. Meaning, it is not enough that one simply believes something is true for it to be true. It must actually be true to count as knowledge. To establish that truth, one must justify their belief. In some sense, we take for granted the justification of our beliefs. Admittedly, looking at an atomic clock is a reasonably sound way to determine the time. And when satisfying the JTB definition of knowledge, the ideas of truth and belief are fairly black and white. The proposition either is or is not true; and we either believe it is true, or we do not. However, when it comes to the justification of truth, and our belief in it, things get a little messy. Enter Edmund Gettier…
Gettier took exception with the tripartite definition of knowledge by demonstrating that one could satisfy the JTB definition but arrive at the justification in such a way that it was merely luck. It was his contention that knowledge justified by luck is a contradiction to the JTB definition. Keeping with our clock scenario, imagine observing a broken clock the moment it happens to agree with the atomic clock. Let’s say the broken clock on the wall says 3 o’clock. If we observe 3 o’clock on the atomic clock and 3 o’clock on the broken clock, according to the JTB definition of knowledge, Gettier claims we have justified a true belief because the truth of the time is indeed 3 o’clock. However, Gettier claims that because our knowledge about the true time was obtained by luck, there is a contradiction in the definition. By observing the broken clock at the opportune moment, Gettier claims our justification for knowledge is false. This is commonly referred to as a “Gettier case.”
To get around the Gettier case, philosophers have often tried appending some additional parameter to the definition of JTB (sometimes called JTB+) to alleviate the contradiction. Notable additions include:
- “S’s belief that p is sensitive if and only if, if p were false, S would not believe that p.
- If p were false, S would not believe that p.
- If S were to believe that p, p would not be false
- S’s belief is not true merely by luck.” (1)
These are all well and good, and each with their own set of debates about whether or not they remove the proposed flaw in the definition. However, instead of trying to modify the definition to accommodate Gettier’s claim, I allege that if the justification of the original claim was false, then we never satisfied all of the criteria for the tripartite definition of knowledge in the first place. If I am right, knowledge was never established by the lucky observation, meaning there is no contradiction. If I am right, one might conclude there is no need to improve upon the definition, at least not to accommodate Gettier. Let me explain…
Digging deeper into the clock example, when we observe the broken clock at precisely the time it agreed with the atomic clock, the justification for our believing the time rested on the belief the broken clock was in good working order. However, as omniscient observers, we know this to be false. We unwittingly justified the truth about the time by sheer luck. Observing both a working and a broken clock when they agreed, established the false belief that both clocks were in good working order. This false justification, lead to a false belief.
Imagine the same scenario, but one where the observer actually knows one clock is broken. One could not knowingly observe a broken clock alone and claim knowledge of the actual time. It would be unjustified. Even if a broken clock is right twice a day, the only way to claim knowledge of those moments would be to justify the belief against a working clock. If such is the case, then we can establish that Gettier assumes an observer is allowed to be unaware that the justification of their belief is invalid. Gettier would have us excuse this invalid justification and count it as knoweldge according to the JTB definition, and then claim a contradiction, rather than accept that observing a broken clock, even unwittingly, is an insufficient claim knowledge the first place. Gettier can’t have it both ways.
Breaking it down, to establish the justification of some proposition as being true, one must look at the preceding justifications that lead up to the mistaken belief to determine where in the causal chain our system of justification breaks down. Consider this claim:
- (p1) a clock is in good working order
- (p2) therefore, observing the clock we can claim knowledge of the time
It is paramount that (p1) be true before we can claim (p2) has a reasonable justification of truth. If (p1) lacks justification, and therefore knowledge, because the clock is broken, then we cannot establish (p2) as being true. In other words, the JTB of (p1) is essential to the justification of (p2). If (p1) is not true, the justification of (p2) cannot be true, so we could never have claimed (p2) as knowledge in the first place! Gettier wrongly insists that (p2) meets the definition of JTB, creating a contradiction. In order to be a contradiction, there must be some scenario where (p2) is both true and false at the same time, but if (p2) never satisfied the definition of JTB, there is simply no contradiction. Let’s continue the thought to ad absurdum…
Central to Gettier’s claim of a contradiction is whether it is reasonable to allow a claim of JTB if one simply believes their justification is valid, despite it being false. Gettier wants to apply a double standard when it comes to truth, and the justification of that truth based on a false, or lucky, belief of justification. Gettier argues that even if the agent is unaware their justification of truth is invalid, they can still claim to have acquired knowledge. This is simply not true. If it is false to claim JTB when the truth of a belief is invalid, it follows that one cannot claim JTB if the justification of that truth is invalid. It would be akin to knowingly observing the broken clock and the working clock when the times did not agree and claiming that both times are justified simply because we wanted to believe in it. The justification of a truth claim being true is by definition necessary for the entire claim to be true. If the truth claim of JTB must be valid independent of the belief of the observer, then the justification of that truth must also be valid independent of the observer. Without that valid justification of the truth, knowledge cannot be claimed.
I think it is fair to conclude, whether an agent is aware that the justification of their belief is invalid, or whether they are simply lucky in the justification of their belief, does not change the requirement that the justification of a claim must be true, despite their belief, in order to establish knowledge. Gettier would have us conclude that knowledge established by luck, instead of justification, is sufficient to establish knowledge. Enough so to claim a contradiction in the tripartite definition. The truth is, there is no contradiction because a true justification is never established; and without justification, there can be no claim to knowledge.
Citations:
1. Ichikawa JJ, Steup M. The Analysis of Knowledge. In: Zalta EN, editor. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [Internet]. Summer 2018. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University; 2018 [cited 2021 Mar 13]. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-analysis/
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